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Fiscal decentralisation has attracted attention from government, academic studies, 
and  international  institutions  with  the  aims  of  enhancing  economic  growth  in  recent 
years.  One  of  the  difficult  issues  is  to  measure  satisfactorily  the  degree  of  fiscal 
decentralisation across countries. This study helps resolve the problem by developing the 
fiscal  decentralisation  index  which  accounts  for  both  fiscal  autonomy  and  fiscal 
importance  of  subnational  governments.  While  the  index  is  an  advance  on  current 
practice,  it  is  still  not  perfect  as  it  assumes  there  is  no  dispersion  of  revenue  and 
expenditure  across  regions.  In  response  to  this  weakness,  fiscal  entropy  and  fiscal 
inequality measures are developed using information theory (Theil, 1967). It is shown 
how fiscal inequality can be decomposed regionally and hierarchically. These ideas are 
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PREFACE 
 
Title of thesis:   Fiscal decentralisation and economic growth 
Supervisors:    Professor Ken Clements, Dr Michael McLure 
 
Fiscal decentralisation has recently emerged as a fundamental issue in the literature 
on economic growth in developing countries. The issue has attracted the attention of both 
academics and international institutions such as the World Bank. The aim of my thesis is 
to enhance understanding of fundamental principles of fiscal decentralisation in public 
finance by: (1) developing the fiscal decentralisation index (“FDI”) which takes the fiscal 
autonomy and the economic dispersion of subnational governments into consideration; 
and  (2)  investigating  the  possible  relationship  between  fiscal  decentralisation  and 
economic growth based on the FDI. 
 
The thesis will examine the following four main topics: 
 
·  The development of the fiscal decentralisation index. This index is basic in 
that  it  accounts  for  the  fundamental  influences  in  the  fiscal  federalism 
literature  concerning  the  fiscal  autonomy  and  importance  of  subnational 
governments. 
·  The  extension  of  the  basic  index  to  derive  the  second  and  third 
approximations  of  fiscal  decentralisation.  These  two  indexes  take  into 
account the dispersion of subnational government revenue and expenditure 
between jurisdiction (in the second approximation) and within jurisdiction 
(in the third approximation). 
·  Empirical  work  on  investigating  the  relationship  between  fiscal 
decentralisation and economic growth, employing an extension of the model 
of neoclassical economic growth due to Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992). 
The FDI enters into the production function to reflect differing levels of  
efficiency of the public sector across countries. 
·  The  relationship  between  fiscal  decentralisation  and  economic  growth  is 
examined for Australia and China and lessons from these countries for the 
fiscal constitution of Vietnam are considered.           
 
The structure of the thesis is as follows: 
 
Chapter 1:   Introduction 
Chapter 2:  Aspects and explorations of fiscal decentralisation 
Chapter 3:   The development of the fiscal decentralisation index 
Chapter 4:  Entropy and fiscal inequalities: Extensions of the FDI 
Chapter 5:  Fiscal  decentralisation  and  economic  growth:  A  Cross-Country 
Analysis 
Chapter 6:  Applications of the FDI: Australia versus China 
Chapter 7:  Vietnam’s fiscal changes and economic growth since 1975 
Chapter 8:  Conclusions 
  The following paper is mostly based on Chapters 3 and 4. 
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1.  Introduction 
  To date, measurement of fiscal decentralisation in studies of public finances has 
been very crude. Typically, either revenue or expenditure from subnational governments 
(“SNGs”) has been employed without taking into account the fiscal autonomy of lower 
level governments. For example, in his pioneering study, Oates (1972) used the national 
government  share  in  total  public  revenue  as  the  degree  of  fiscal  centralisation.  More 
recently, Woller and Phillips (1998) measured fiscal decentralisation in one of four ways: 
(1) the ratio of local government revenues to total government revenues; (2) the ratio of 
local government revenues less grants-in-aid to total government revenues; (3) the ratio 
of local government expenditures to total government expenditures and (4) the ratio of 
local government expenditures to total government expenditures less defence and social 
security expenditures. Similarly, Davoodi and Zou (1998) measured the level of fiscal 
decentralisation as the spending by SNGs as a fraction of total government spending. It is 
widely accepted that measurement of fiscal decentralisation in previous works has been 
undertaken  on  a  superficial  basis.  There  has  been  no  recognition  of  the  important 
distinction  between  subnational  “revenue”  and  own  sourced  revenue  over  which 
subnational jurisdiction have policy autonomy.   
  The literature on fiscal federalism is extended in this study by developing a fiscal 
decentralisation  index  (“FDI”)  that  is  sensitive  to  fiscal  autonomy  of  subnational 
governments and differences in expenditure and revenue between SNGs. Three indexes 
of  fiscal  decentralisation  are  introduced,  with  each  one  a  more  refined  and  extended 
version  of  its  predecessor:  (i)  the  “first  approximation”  index  accounts  for  the 
fundamental  influences  of  the  fiscal  autonomy  and  fiscal  importance  of  subnational 
governments by focusing on the aggregate revenue and expenditure of SNGs as a whole; 
(ii) the “second approximation” index accounts for dispersion of revenue and expenditure 
across SNGs; and (iii) the third approximation accounts for differences in spending and 
revenue by all governments within each state, including local governments.  
As  discussed  above,  many  previous  attempts  to  measure  the  degree  of  fiscal 
decentralisation involve the use of some form of share of revenue/expenditure at lower-
level jurisdictions in the national total.  It is the claim of this paper that such an approach 
is  inadequate  as  it  completely  ignores  important  distributional  aspects  of  fiscal   2 
arrangements.  Consider  two  hypothetical  economies,  A  and  B.    In  both  economies, 
government spending and revenue at the national level accounts for 50 percent of the 
total, so that the remaining 50 percent is the responsibility of subnational government.  
The difference is that in A there are only two large subnational institutions that have an 
equal  share  of  the  total  50  percent;  while  in  B  there  are  100  subnational  units,  each 
accounting for 1 percent of the 50 percent total.  It is clear that there is substantially more 
fiscal decentralisation in B as compared to A.  However, an exclusive focus of the split of 
the  total  between  the  national  and  subnational  levels  would  lead  one  to  erroneously 
conclude that both economies exhibit the same degree of fiscal decentralisation.  In other 
words, both the first and second moments of the distribution of revenue/expenditure are 
important  for  understanding  the  workings  of  fiscal  arrangements.  In  this  paper  we 
develop  measures  of  the  dispersion  of  revenue  and  expenditure  using  ideas  from 
information theory. 
The paper is organised into seven sections. The distinct notions of fiscal autonomy 
and fiscal importance of subnational governments – two cornerstones of fiscal federalism 
literature  -  are  discussed  in  Section  2,  culminating  in  the  development  of  the  first 
approximation  index  to  fiscal  decentralisation.  Elements  of  information  theory  as 
developed by Theil (1967) are presented in Section 3. This provides the analytical basis 
for subsequent approximate indexes to fiscal decentralisation. An extensive discussion of 
“entropy” and fiscal decentralisation is included in Section 4. Entropy is used to measure 
revenue equality, and then inequality, among subnational governments. In the context of 
fiscal decentralisation, total revenue inequality  across regions can be divided into the 
between-state and within-state inequalities in terms of revenue and expenditure shares. 
The influence of between-state fiscal inequalities and within-state fiscal inequalities on 
the degree of fiscal decentralisation is discussed in Section 5; this material provides the 
foundations for the development of the second and third approximations to the FDI in 
subsequent work. A preliminary discussion of the nature of these indexes is presented in 
Section 6. Concluding remarks are given in Section 7.    
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2.  Fiscal autonomy and importance: the development of the FDI 
Tiebout’s classic article “A pure theory of local expenditures” was published in 
1956. In the next half century, the field of fiscal federalism developed substantially and 
contributed to a large body of literature on fiscal decentralisation. Seminal studies by 
Tiebout  (1956),  Musgrave  (1959)  and  Oates  (1972)  laid  the  foundation  for  the 
significant discussions of fiscal decentralisation. Tiebout (1956) introduced the notion of 
local public expenditures to demonstrate that, in a fiscally decentralised country, perfect 
mobility  of  citizens  between  localities  will  result  in  competition  among  localities  in 
providing goods and services and that the sequent migration between jurisdictions would 
serve  to  increase  economic  efficiency.  Three  years  later,  Musgrave  (1959)  laid  the 
general foundations for modern public finance theory, stressing that the best allocation 
of scarce resources will be achieved whenever preferences and tastes of local citizens 
have been met. Subsequently, Oates (1972) argued that there should be variations in the 
provisions  of  public  goods  and  services  between  governments  since  inhabitants  in 
different  regions  have  different  tastes  in  their  consumption  patterns.  From  this 
perspective,  subnational  governments  will  better  understand  their  local  citizens  in 
comparison  to  the  national  government  which  always  provides  the  same  bundles  of 
goods across regions without regard to regional variations in tastes and preferences. In 
addition, if the national government is the only provider of public goods and services for 
the  community,  there  will  be  no  incentive  for  it  to  improve  efficiency  due  to  non 
existence  of  competition,  whereas  subnational  governments  have  to  face  the  fierce 
competitions  from  neighbourhoods.  Oates  formalised  treatment  of  the  issue  by 
developing the first decentralisation theorem: 
 “For  a  public  good  –  the  consumption  of  which  is  defined  over 
geographical subsets of the total population, and for which the costs of 
providing each level of output of the good in each jurisdiction are the 
same for the central or the respective local government – it will always 
be  more  efficient  (or  at  least  as  efficient)  for  local  governments  to 
provide  the  Pareto-efficient  levels  of  output  for  their  respective 
jurisdictions than for the central government to provide any specified 
and uniform level of output across all jurisdictions” (Oates, 1972, p. 35).   
Discussion on fiscal decentralisation has generally centred on four main areas: the 
assignment  of  expenditure  responsibility;  revenue  assignment  (taxing  powers);   4 
intergovernmental  fiscal  transfers;  and  responsibility  for  subnational  borrowing. 
Conceptually, these topics can be considered with respect to two broad categories: (i) 
fiscal  autonomy  of  subnational  governments;  and  (ii)  relative  fiscal  importance  of 
subnational  governments  (Vo,  2005).  The  fiscal  autonomy  of  SNGs  is  primarily 
influenced  by  the  assignment  of  taxing  powers  and  supplementary  tools  such  as 
intergovernmental  fiscal  transfers  and  fiscal  equalisation,  discretion  over  subnational 
borrowing  and  the  assignment  of  responsibility  for  public  provision  of  goods  and 
services. In contrast, relative fiscal importance is most directly connected to the share of 
public sector expenditure responsibilities met by SNGs. 
 
2.1  Fiscal autonomy of SNGs 
Agreement on the distribution of taxing powers is difficult since the public sector 
players  (national  government  and  SNGs)  approach  their  respective  powers  from  two 
different perspectives. While the national government continues keeping important tax 
sources for economic stabilisation and income redistribution, SNGs typically focus on 
taxing  powers  to  generate  revenue  to  fund  their  provision  of  services  which  are 
fundamental to community welfare such as healthcare, education and public order. When 
the assignment of tax bases across levels of governments is extensive, the gap between 
spending responsibility and taxing power of SNGs will be minimal, leading to a high 
degree of fiscal autonomy of SNGs. Fiscal autonomy of SNGs implies that, to some 
extent, SNGs can arrange their own sourced revenue by exercising their taxing powers to 
cover  costs  occurring  in  the  provision  of  public  goods  and  services.  In  such 
circumstances, intergovernmental fiscal transfers will not represent a significant source of 
revenue  for  SNGs.  It  should  be  noted  that,  however,  even  in  the  absence  of  fiscal 
transfers (“grants”), SNGs will not enjoy full fiscal autonomy if they receive taxes or 
shares from revenue bases directly controlled and defined by the national government 
(McLure, 2001). The necessary condition for a significant level of fiscal autonomy is that 
SNGs themselves have the discretion to set the tax rates and/ or bases (so that they can 
adjust their revenue by varying the rates and/ or the bases) in response to fiscal demand 
for publicly provided services. If this is not the case, flexibility and the potential for 
creativity by SNGs for the efficient provision of public goods and services are limited.     5 
In the event of a long-period mismatch between SNGs’ spending responsibility and 
revenue capacity, vertical fiscal imbalance will inevitably emerge and must be managed 
by  the  national  government  through  intergovernmental  fiscal  grants  and  advances.  If 
SNGs are given adequately fiscal autonomy, ex-post vertical fiscal imbalance is expected 
to be minimised before any fiscal transfer takes place. However, it is also argued that if 
the national government focuses exclusively on filling the gap of vertical fiscal issues, 
this decision may reduce the incentive for the SNGs to increase their respective taxing 
powers and to manage public spending efficiently (Ahmad and Craig, 1997). One option 
for reducing the vertical fiscal imbalance without reform of tax assignment is to re-assign 
some spending responsibility for goods and services provision from SNGs to the national 
government. However, experience suggests that mismatch between spending and taxing 
will also provide some balancing role for the national government in fiscal transfers (Bird 
and Smart, 2002).  
  In essence, the greater the share of SNG expenditure funded from subnational 
own sourced revenue (“OSR”), the more fiscally decentralised a nation is. However, this 
is  adjusted  by  the  adjustment  factor  (“AF”)  from  two  major  influences:  (i)  total 
proportion of intergovernmental grants received that are “untied” (i.e. unconditional); and 
(ii) the extent of SNG fiscal autonomy in borrowing decision. As a consequence, the 
relative level of autonomy, which can be called “fiscal autonomy”, for SNGs can be 
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where  i OSR   represents  for  the  own  sourced  revenue  for  subnational  region  i; 
i E  
represents  for  the  expenditure  made  by  subnational  region  i;  AF  represents  the 
adjustment factor; and  N  is the number of subnational regions. 
Fiscal  autonomy  of  SNGs  is  fundamental  and  important  feature  of  fiscal 
decentralisation. However, fiscal autonomy is only one aspect of fiscal decentralisation, 
which also depends on the proportion of national fiscal activity undertaken by SNGs, or 
their “fiscal importance”.   6 
2.2  Relative fiscal importance of SNGs 
The  principle  of  subsidiarity  suggests  that  economic  performances  of  the 
governments will be more responsive to consumer demands and to cost cutting pressures 
(i.e. more efficient) if services are provided by the lowest level of government possible. 
While  foreign  policy,  defence,  immigration,  and  international  trade  can  be  best 
formulated and implemented by the national government, SNGs are able to carry out 
some important tasks for regional and local communities such as law, order and public 
safety, education, health policy, as well as very local issues such as street lighting system, 
local sewerage, garbage collection, and local paper deliveries, etc. Services provided by 
the national government are consistent with the law of subsidiarity when demand is at a 
constant level across various subnational localities. However, when demand varies from 
location to location, national provision to a common standard leads to inefficient under-
provision, in some areas, and inefficient over-provision, in other areas. In short, services 
provided by the national government assume tastes and preferences to be homogeneous 
across locations and for citizens within locations.  
SNGs operate closely to local inhabitants so that they are the sole agents, who are in 
the best position to understand preferences, tastes and amount demanded. It is clear that 
levels of goods and services provided should not be exceeded the amount demanded by 
the community. This can avoid both under or overprovision of public goods and services. 
Moreover, a system of fees, users’ charges can be considered useful and effective for the 
purpose of cost recovered (McLure and Martinez-Vazquez, 2004). The larger the portion 
of the total public spending cake attributable to SNGs, the higher the degree of fiscal 
importance and the more likely it is that the benefits from the law of subsidiarity will be 
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where TE represents total public sector expenditures of the whole economy (including 
both expenditures from the national government and all SNGs). 
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2.3  The development of the fiscal decentralisation index 
The notions of fiscal autonomy [equation (2.1)] and fiscal importance [equation 
(2.2)] of subnational governments may need to be used simultaneously to establish a 
reliable index of fiscal decentralisation. Such fiscal decentralisation index, as developed 
in Vo (2005), is: 
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where  i OSR   represents  for  the  own  sourced  revenue  for  subnational  region  i;  i E  
represents  for  the  expenditure  made  by  subnational  region  i;  AF  represents  the 
adjustment  factor  for  the  country  and  0 1 AF £ £ ;  TE   represents  total  public  sector 
expenditures  of  the  whole  economy  (including  expenditures  from  the  national 
government and all SNGs); and  N  is the number of subnational regions.  
As components (A) and (B) are to be both positive fractions, and  0 1 AF £ £ , we 
can conclude that FDI will also be a positive fraction. Also, the higher the value of FDI, 
the more fiscally decentralised is the country. 
 
2.4  Fiscal decentralisation index for selected countries 
  To illustrate the application of this index, it has been applied to a range of countries 
selected  based  on  a  different  level  of  economic  growth  and  different  institutional 
structure  of  the  governments.  The  results  are  reported  in  Table  1,  which  reports  on 
countries from: the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
(items 1 to 19 inclusive); the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (items 
20 to 22 inclusive); and other developing countries with middle level of income (items 23 
to 26). In order to measure the dispersion of political institutions, both federal and unitary 
counties are considered. Table 1 also reveals that the degree of fiscal decentralisation in 
federal  countries  is  generally  higher  than  that  of  unitary  countries  since  their  SNGs’ 
responsibilities and powers are often assured by their constitutions (this guarantee cannot   8 
basically  be  found  in  the  constitutions  of  unitary  countries).  Also,  with  developed 
countries,  their  subnational  governments  are  more  advanced  in  terms  of  managerial 
capability and experience in comparison with developing countries. As a result, fiscal 
decentralisation is expected to occur to a larger extent in developed countries. 
 
   TABLE 1 
FISCAL DECENTRALISATION INDEX OF SELECTED COUNTRIES 
























= ∑   TE  AF  FDI 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
1  Australia  2002  Bil. AUD  71  125  271  0.81   0.46  
2  Austria  2002  Bil. Euro  29  40  115  0.63   0.39  
3  Belgium  2001  Bil. Euro  23  50  134  0.69   0.35  
4  Canada  2002  Bil. CAD  281  324  503  0.94   0.72  
5  Germany  2002  Bil. Euro  351  444  1,066  0.75   0.50  
6  Mexico  2000  Bil. Pesos  193  459  1,136  0.44   0.27  
7  Switzerland  2001  Bil. Franc  86  105  166  0.81   0.65  
8  United States  2001  Bil. USD  1,738  2,040  3,713  0.88   0.64  
9  Czech Rep.  2002  Bil. Koruny  141  242  1,089  0.63   0.28  
10  Denmark  2002  Bil. Kroner  294  462  788  0.75   0.53  
11  France  2001  Bil. Euro  86  146  771  0.69   0.28  
12  Hungary  2002  Bil. Forint  1,044  2,197  8,950  0.50   0.24  
13  Italy  2000  Bil. Euro  96  163  544  0.50   0.30  
14  Japan  2001  Bil JPY (000)  80  79  286  0.56   0.40  
15  Netherlands  2002  Bil. Euro  22  72  211  0.63   0.26  
16  Poland  2002  Bil. Zlotys  70  120  350  0.56   0.33  
17  Spain  2000  Bil. Euro  74  90  276  0.56   0.39  
18  Sweden  2001  Bil. Kroner  446  567  1,300  0.75   0.51  
19  UK  2002  Bil. GBP  41  117  433  0.56   0.23  
                 
20  Malaysia  1997  Bil. Ringgit  9  13  68  0.50   0.26  
21  Thailand  2002  Bil. BHT  76  138  1,379  0.44   0.16  
22  Vietnam  2002  Bil. VND (000)  31  65  148  0.25   0.23  
                 
23  Argentina  2002  Bil. Pesos  25  36  91  0.69   0.44  
24  Brazil  1998  Bil. Reais  146  182  400  0.50   0.43  
25  China   1999  Bil. Yuan  759  1,155  1,637  0.50   0.48  
26  India  1999  Bil. Rupees.(000)  1,188  2,676  5,870  0.50   0.32  
Source:   IMF, Government Finance Statistic Yearbooks 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004. 
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FIGURE 1
THE FISCAL DECENTRALISATION INDEX
SELECTED COUNTRIES




































































































































































































2.5  Potential weaknesses of the FDIs 
Equation  (2.3)  has  two  potentially  significant  limitations.  Firstly,  revenue  and 
expenditure  in  all  SNGs  is  implicitly  assumed  to  be  equal.  In  effect,  all  regions  are 
assumed  to  be  a  homogeneous  fiscal  mass.  However,  it  is  well  known  that  SNGs 
typically involve large differences in revenue and spending, differences that could have 
significant implications for fiscal decentralisation. Secondly, the structure of the fiscal 
constitution is ignored. Subnational governments are not differentiated by type – the state 
government level is not distinguished from the local government level. These structural 
changes may also impact on fiscal decentralisation. For example, local councils have 
different  distribution  of  revenue  and  spending  within  the  same  state.  Furthermore, 
population, revenue, and expenditure across states are also different.  
As  equation  (2.3)  accounts  only  for  the  fundamental  influences  of  the  fiscal 
autonomy and fiscal importance of subnational governments while ignoring the impact of 
fiscal differences between them, it can only be considered as a “first approximation”. To 
redress these shortcomings, the fiscal decentralisation index will be extended by using 
information theory as developed by Theil (1967). The main goals of the extensions of the 
first approximation index are to account for the distributions of revenue and expenditure 
shares of all governments (including local governments) between the state jurisdictions   10 
(in the second approximation) and the distribution of revenue and expenditure shares of 
all governments (including local governments) within a state jurisdiction. The concepts of 
“between-set entropy” and “within-set entropy” appear to have the potential to account 
for heterogeneity in fiscal shares across different levels of governments.  
 
3.  Entropy and information theory 
Information  theory  provides  a  convenient  way  to  summarise  probability 
distributions and how they change with the receipt of new information. This section sets 
out the key principles of information theory, drawing on Theil (1967, Chapters 2 and 3). 
These principles are then applied into next section to measuring distributional aspects of 
fiscal arrangements 
  Any  possibility  occurs  with  the  probability  x  with  0 1. x £ £   The  message  is 
considered to be a definite and reliable message if, with its presence, one possibility is 
confirmed to occur. Let  ( ) h x  be information content of a definite and reliable message 
, x  then  ( ) h x  is the decreasing function of the probability . x  Among all such decreasing 
functions, we choose: 
1
( ) log log . h x x
x
= = -  
As will be shown subsequently, the reasons for choosing  log x -  are that it leads to (i) 
convenient decomposition and (ii) measures that have an axiomatic justification. 
Until  the  message  is  released,  no  one  can  predict  how  large  the  “information 
content” will be since either  1 ( ),.., ( ) N h x or h x  with different probabilities  1 ... N x x ¹ ¹  
can  occur.  However,  the  average  or  expected  information  content  can  be  calculated 
before the message comes in since we know the probabilities: 
1 1 1
1
( ) ( ) log log .
N N N
i i i i i
i i i i
H x x h x x x x
x = = =
= = = - ∑ ∑ ∑  
As  the  product  of  log i i x x   is  always  non-positive, 
1 log 0
N
i i i x x
= £ ∑ .  Therefore,  the 
negative  of  this  sum,  ( ) H x ,  cannot  be  negative.  The  measure  ( ) H x   is  the  expected 
information of a distribution, which Theil calls “entropy”. In addition, the value of the   11 
entropy  ( ) H x has a lower limit of zero and the upper limit of log N , where  N  represents 
a number of events or possibilities, so that 0 ( ) log . H x N £ £ .  
Unlike a direct and reliable message, the presence of an indirect message does not 
confirm anything, rather it only provides more information regarding the event which is 
likely  to  occur  in  the  future.  It  is  assumed  we  have  N   events  as  1,.., N E E   with  the 
probabilities to occur are  1,.., N x x , respectively. These probabilities are known as prior 
probabilities since they exist before the message comes in. When the message comes in, 
these probabilities become  1,.., n y y , respectively. These are called posterior probabilities. 




= = ∑   0 1,.., . i y i N ³ " =  
These posterior probabilities are also non-negative. If this turns out to be that one of 
these probabilities is one, all the others are zero, the message becomes direct message. 
The “probability ex post” is the probability of the event to occur after the message is 
released:  i y .  In  addition,  “probability  ex  ante”  is  the  probability  of  the  event  to  be 
occurred before the message is released, still  i x  in this case. Therefore, the information 
content  in  the  case  of  “indirect  message”  is:  ( ) ( , ) log . i i i i h y x y x =   The  expected 
information of the indirect message is as follows: 
1








=∑ y x  
The  expected  information  of  an  indirect  message  ( : ) I y x   transforms  the  prior 
probabilities  [ ] 1,.., N x x ¢ = x  into posterior probabilities [ ] 1,.., N y y ¢ = y . This can be shown 
that  ( : ) I y x  is non-negative.  
 
4.  Entropy and revenue inequality 
In his influential study, Theil (1967) advocated the use of entropy-based measure 
for the  analysis of income inequality.  In this section, we apply Theil’s notion of the 
entropy to public finance.  
It is assumed that a country has Q states (the second level of governments) and P 
local councils (the third level of governments) and each local council belongs to one   12 
state. Let  N P Q = +  be a total number of local and state governments, the number of 
subnational governments (SNGs). It is further assumed that each SNG accounts for a 
non-negative fraction of total subnational revenue, to be denoted by  i r  which for short we 
shall refer to as the “regional revenue share”. The sum of these all revenue shares is equal 
to unity: 
1 1, 0 1,..., .
N
i i i r r i N
= = ³ " = ∑  Let r  denote the vector of the revenue shares 
1,.., N r r . The entropy of the revenue shares is defined as:  
 (4.1)         
1
1






=∑ r  
The entropy  ( ) H r can be regarded as the measure of the equality with which revenue is 
distributed among the SNGs. When the revenue distribution is extremely equal in that 
each SNG has the same revenue share (i.e.,  1 i r N = ) and the entropy is at its maximum: 
( ) log . H N = r  At the other extreme, if only one SNG accounts for all revenue so that 
others have no revenue at all (i.e.,  1 i r =  and  0 j r =  for i j ¹ ), the minimum value of the 
entropy is achieved:  ( ) 0. H = r  As a result, the range of the entropy is  ( ) 0 log . H N £ £ r  
 In the context of the distribution of revenue, it is more convenient to focus on 
revenue inequality, rather than revenue equality. Revenue inequality can be measured by 
deducting the entropy  ( ) H r  from its maximum value, log : N  
(4.2)              
1 1
1




N H N r r Nr
r = =
- = - = ∑ ∑ r  
Due to the constraints on the range of the entropy  ( ), H r  it is clear that the range of this 
measure  of  revenue  inequality  is  0  --  perfect  equality  (when  ( ) log H N = r )  --  and 
log N  -- maximum inequality (when  ( ) 0 H = r ).  The entropy  ( ) H r  is an attractive way 
to measure equality as it satisfies three axioms or tests described below.  
 
4.1  Axiom 1: The proportionality test 
The entropy (4.1) is expressed in terms of the revenue shares of SNGs. Thus, if all 
revenues changes proportionally, the shares do not change, and measure (4.2) remains   13 
unchanged.  This  invariance  of  revenue  inequality  to  a  proportional  change  is  the 
proportionality test.  
 
4.2  Axiom 2: The “Haves and Have Nots” test 
The upper limit of  ( ) H r , increases with  , N  so that the maximum value of the 
inequality measure (4.2) rises with  . N  Consider two hypothetical countries. Firstly, in a 
two-subnational region country, there is perfect inequality when one SNG accounts for all 
revenue, and the other has no revenue. The entropy of the revenue shares is zero, and the 
value  of  (4.2)  is  log2.  Secondly,  in  a  society  consisting  of  10,000  SNGs,  revenue 
inequality is  at maximum when 9,999 SNGs have no  revenue. The value of revenue 
inequality is now  log10,000. It is obvious that revenue distribution in the latter is much 
more unequal than the first country. In the first country, one-half of the SNGs (one SNG) 
accounts for all revenue and the other half has no revenue. As a result, revenue inequality 
of the second country is as unequal as for the first country when one-half of the SNGs 
account for all revenue and when each of these has the same revenue. The concern is that 
whether revenue inequality, as expressed in equation (4.2), satisfies this condition. The 
following material reveals that this is true by showing that as a larger fraction of SNGs 
join  the  “revenue”  group,  revenue  inequality  falls.  This  establishes  that  revenue 
inequality will be uniquely determined by the size of the revenue group (which we call 
“the haves”) relative to the “no-revenue” group (“the have nots”). 
Assume  there  is  a  set  S  which  consists  of  M   subnational  governments  where 
0 . M N < £  It is further assumed that SNGs in set  S  account for all revenue, so that 
SNGs outside set S have no revenue. Also, within set S , each SNG accounts for the same 
amount of revenue (i.e., for  , 1 . i i S r M Î = ). The inequality measure (4.2) then becomes:  
1
1 1 1 1
log log log log ...,
i
N
i i i i
i i
r Nr r Nr N N
M M M M = Î




(4.3)       
1
1







= = ∑ q
   14 
where  M N q =   is  the  fraction  of  SNGs  in  the  country  who  jointly  account  for  all 
subnational revenue. The application of the last member of equation (4.3) to the second 
example  above  with  10,000 = N   and  5,000 10,000 1 2, q = =   reveals  that  revenue 
inequality is also log2.  
From these two examples, we can conclude that when revenue is equally distributed 
among  some  groups  of  SNGs  in  the  society,  and  the  remaining  SNGs  outside  these 
groups have no revenue, revenue inequality of the country is determined solely by the 
fraction q  -- the ratio of the number of SNGs in the group to the total number of SNGs. 
In both examples above, this ratio is 1 2, and the revenue inequality is log2. This result 
is  in  consistence  with  intuition:  when  the  number  of  SNGs  receiving  revenue,  , M  
increases, revenue distribution becomes more equal. The above discussion shows that as 
the inequality (4.3) decreases as the share of a number of SNGs which receive revenue 
rises, this measure satisfies the “Haves and Have Nots” axiom. 
 
4.3  Axiom 3: The revenue transfer test 
Consider an economy consisting two SNGs only  A (rich) and  B  (poor) with the 
revenue shares  A r  and  B r , where  . A B r r >  Suppose that some revenue is transferred from 
A to  , B  such that  0. A B dr dr + =  A reasonable measure of revenue inequality should 
indicate  that  such  a  transfer  from  the  rich  SNG  to  the  poor  SNG  has  the  effect  of 
decreasing inequality. Does equation (4.2) satisfy this property? The following material 
shows that it does have this property. 
It is assumed that there are  G  sets of SNGs, to be denoted by  1,.., , G S S  and each 
SNG belongs to one and only one set. Let  g N be a number of SNGs in set  g S , with 
1 .
G
g g N N
= = ∑  The entropy of revenue shares, equation (4.1), then can be expressed as: 
(4.4)       
1
1













where the component inside the square brackets is the entropy of revenue shares within 
set  . g S  Let  g R  be the sum of revenue shares of all SNGs in set  , g S   ; g i g i R r Î =∑ S  this   15 




= = ∑  The entropy of revenue shares 
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r  where  g r  is the vector of  i r  that fall under 
, g S as the within-set entropy, we have: 
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Combining equations (4.4) and (4.5), the total entropy becomes: 
 (4.6)         ( )
1 1
1
( ) log .
G G
g g g g
g g g
H R H R
R = =
= + ∑ ∑ r r  
On the right-hand side of this equation, the first component is a weighted average of the 
within-set entropies  ( ) ( ) 1 1 ,..., , G G H H r r  with the group revenue shares  1,..., G R R  as the 
weights.  The  second  term  on  the  right  of  equation  (4.6)  is  the  between-set  entropy, 
( ) 1 log 1 .
G
g g g R R
= ∑  
  We consider equation (4.6) in the context of SNGs  A (rich) and  B  (poor) in two 
situations: (i) when they are the only SNGs of the country, so that  2; N =  and (ii) when 
the nation is made up of  , A B plus all other SNGs, so that  2. N >  When  2, N =  the 
country comprises two groups,  1 , S A =  and  2 , S B =  which we shall denote by  A S  and 
. B S  Similarly, the revenue shares are  1 A R r =  and  2 , B R r =  with  1. A B r r + =  As there is 
only one SNG in each group, the within-group entropies are zero,  ( ) ( ) 0, A A B B H r H r = =  
as is their weighted average. Accordingly, in this case, equation (4.6) simplifies to: 
( )
1 1




= + r    16 
This  entropy  is  at  its  maximum  when  1 2. A B r r = =   In  that  case,  the  entropy  is 
( ) 1 2log2 1 2log2 log2, H = + = r  as is illustrated below. From the graph, it is clear that 
any deviations from the equal shares of  1 2 A B r r = =  will result in a lower value of the 
entropy, that is, higher revenue inequality. As  A is richer than  , B  the initial revenue 
distribution is represented in the graph by the shares  1 2 x >  and  ( ) 1 1 2. x - <  When 
revenue  is  transferred  from  A  to  , B   both  revenue  shares  move  towards  1 2,  the 











Next, consider the  2 N >  case where there are three groups of SNGs: (i) Group A 
with only one SNG  ; A  group  B  with SNG  ; B  and (iii) group  C  with  ( ) 2 N -  SNGs 
comprising every SNG in the economy except  A and  . B  These three groups are denoted 
by  , , and . A B C S S S  We assume that the joint revenue share of  A and  B  is a constant, i.e. 
constant. A B A B r r R + + = =  This implies that the revenue share of group  , C   , C R  is also 
constant at  A B 1 R . + -  It is further assumed that there are no revenue transfers to or from 
the other SNGs of the society in  . C S  We now apply decomposition (4.6) to this economy. 
The weighted average of the within-group entropies, the first term on the right-hand side 
of equation (4.6), is: 




g g g A A A B B B C C C C C C
g
R H R H r R H r R H R H
=
= + + = ∑ r r r  
1 - x 
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( ) H r  
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i C i C
r
H
R r R Î
= ∑
S
r  with  C r  is the vector of  i r  that fall under group  , C S  is 
the within-group entropy of group  . C  The first and second components in the second step 
of equation (4.7), the within-group entropies for groups  A and  , B  disappear because 
there is only one SNG in each group. In addition, the between-group entropy, the second 
term on the right-hand side of equation (4.6), now becomes: 
(4.8)     
1
1 1 1 1
log log log log .
G
g A B C
g g A B C
R R R R
R R R R =
= + + ∑  
  Substituting equations (4.7) and (4.8) into equation (4.6), the total entropy for this 
three-group country becomes: 
(4.9)     ( ) ( )
1 1 1
log log log . A B C C C C
A B C
H R R R R H
R R R
= + + + r r  
When we transfer revenue from  A to  , B  with the distribution within  C S  remaining 
unchanged, equation (4.9) can be expressed as: 
(4.10)        ( )
1 1




= + + r  
The constant in (4.10) includes  ( ) log 1 C C R R  and  ( ). C C C R H r  In words, the total entropy 
of  the  three-group  country  is  equal  to  the  total  entropy  of  two-group  country  plus  a 
constant. Accordingly, the impact on inequality of a transfer from  A to  B  is the same in 
the  2 N >  case as it is in the  2 N =  case.  
To summarise this discussion, revenue inequality decreases if there is a transfer of 
revenue from the rich SNG to the poor SNG. This conclusion holds for a society with 
two-subnational regions  ( ) 2 , N =  as well as in the higher-dimensional case  ( ) 2 . N >  In 
short, it is clear that the measure of revenue inequality satisfies the revenue transfer test. 
 
5.  Decomposing revenue inequality 
  In  the  above,  we  decomposed  revenue  equality  into  within-set  and  between-set 
terms. We now show that revenue inequality can be similarly decomposed.  
  Recall  from  equation  (4.6)  that  the  entropy  is  decomposed  into  two  distinct 
components: a weighted average of the within-set entropy and the between-set entropy.   18 
Furthermore, as in (4.2), inequality is measured by the difference between the maximum 
value of the entropy,  log N  and the entropy  ( ). H r  Thus, by combining equations (4.2) 
and (4.6), revenue inequality can be expressed as: 
(5.1)      
1 1
1
log ( ) log ( ) log .
G G
g g g g
g g g
N H N R H R
R = =
- = - - ∑ ∑ r r  
The  right-hand  side  of  equation  (5.1)  remains  unchanged  if  we  subtract  and  add 
1 log ,
G
g g g R N
= ∑  where  g R  and  g N  are the revenue share of and a number of SNGs in set 
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As the result, revenue inequality can be expressed as follows: 
(5.2)    
1 1
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Result (5.2) reveals that revenue inequality consists of two distinct components: (i) a 
weighted average of within-set inequalities and (ii) a between-set inequality. The right-
hand side of equation (5.2) parallels the decompositions given by equation (4.6). The 
meaning of the two components of equation (5.2) is discussed further in what follows. 
 
5.1  The within-set inequalities 
The first component of (5.2) is a weighted average of the within-set inequalities: 








g i g g
r R r
R
R N = Î
 
 




The term  i g r R  is the conditional revenue share of SNG i within group  , g S  that is, SNG 
i’s revenue share within the group. Also,  g N  represents a number of SNGs in group  . g S  








Î =∑ S   the   19 
within-set revenue inequality for group  , g S  and (b) 
1 ,
G
g g g R Z
= ∑  the weighted average of 
the within-set revenue inequalities. We discuss each in turn. 
  If each SNG in set  g S  receives an equal revenue share, then  i g r R k =  (say). 
However, as  ( ) 1,
g i g i r R
Î = ∑ S  it follows that  1 . g k N =  When each SNG has an equal 
share of the group’s revenue, i.e.,  1 , , i g g g r R N i = ÎS  then there is no dispersion of the 
revenue distribution within the group, the perfect equality. Accordingly, the extent to 
which the  g N  ratios 









deviate  from  unity  is  a  measure  of  revenue  inequality  within  set  . g S   The  within-set 
measure  of  revenue  inequality,  the  term  in  square  brackets  of  equation  (5.3),  is  a 
weighted average of the logarithms of the ratios in equation (5.4), the weights being the 
conditional revenue shares.  
 
5.2  The between-set inequality 
The second term on the right-hand side of (5.2) is the between-set inequality: 









N N = ∑   
The basic ingredient of inequality (5.5) is the contrast between two sets of shares, the 
revenue  shares  of  the  G   groups,  1,..., G R R   and  the  corresponding  population  shares, 
1 ,..., . G N N N N   If  all  groups  receive  their  pro-rata  shares  of  revenue  based  on 
population,  i.e.  , 1,..., , g g R N N g G = =   then  there  is  no  dispersion  of  revenue 
distribution and we have perfect between-set revenue equality.  
  In summary, total inequality consists of two components: the weighted average of 
the within-set inequality and the between-set inequality. Interestingly, it is clear that both 
components are of the form of the expected information content of an indirect message 
which was previously discussed in Section 3. For the within-set inequality, the prior and 
posterior  probabilities  are  1 g N   and  i g r R ,  respectively.  Similarly,  for  a  between-set   20 
inequality,  g N N   and  g R   are  prior  and  posterior  probabilities.  Furthermore,  from 
equation (5.2), the revenue inequality, can be written as: 
(5.6)      
1 1







N H r Nr r
N = =
- = = ∑ ∑ r   
The far right-hand side of equation (5.6) reveals that total revenue inequality can also be 
expressed in the form of the expected information content of an indirect message. In this 
case,  the  prior  and  posterior  probabilities  are  1 N   and  , i r   respectively.  With  this 
perspective, it is clear that the message that transforms the vector  [ ] 1 ,...,1 N N ¢ into 
[ ] 1,..., N r r ¢  is  equivalent  to  two  sub-messages.  The  first  message  transforms  
1 ,...,1 g g N N ¢      into  1 ,..., , g g g r R r R ¢       1,..., , g G =  which could be called “the within-
set message”, and the second message transforms  [ ] 1 ,..., G N N N N ¢ into  [ ] 1,..., , G R R ¢  
which is “the between-set message”. 
 
5.3  Why not per capita fiscal data? 
  The above fiscal inequalities are expressed in terms of the number of subnational 
governments,  rather  than  a  number  of  individuals.  That  is  to  say,  according  to  our 
approach,  per  capita  fiscal  data  are  irrelevant  for  the  measurement  of  fiscal 
decentralisation. Why?  
    Consider the two countries A and B discussed in Section 1. Country A has two local 
councils, each of the same size, whereas country B consists of 100 local councils (again, 
all of the same size). Revenue generated by country A is equal to the sum of revenue of 
the 100 councils in country B. As it has many more local councils, country B is more 
fiscally decentralised as compared to country A. This conclusion is perfectly reasonable 
and stands independently of the size of the population in the two countries, and how the 
population is distributed across the 100 local governments in country B. 
Next, consider a real-world example from the fastest-growing state in Australia, 
Western Australia (“WA”). In terms of expenditure, the largest local government in WA 
is the City of Stirling, while the smallest is Shire of Three Springs. Columns 2 and 3 of   21 
Table 2 show that expenditure in Stirling is almost 100 times greater than that in Three 
Springs. However, the population in Stirling is almost 250 times larger than that of Three 
Springs (columns 4 and 5). Spending per capita is therefore significantly higher in Three 
Springs than in Stirling, as presented in column 6.   
TABLE 2 
EXPENDITURE AND POPULATION IN TWO LOCAL COUNCILS  
IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA, 2004 
Expenditure     Population     Per capita expenditure 
Local council 
$' '000  Percent of  
WA total    Persons  Percent of  
WA total    $  Deflated 
(1)  (2)  (3)     (4)  (5)     (6)  (7) 
City of Stirling  100,405  5.97    182,047  9.06     552  0.66  
Shire of Three Springs  1,338  0.08     722  0.04      1,853  2.00  
Source: Unpublished ABS data. 
  Let  i s  be the expenditure share of local council  ( ) 1,2 , i i =  and 
2
1 i i S S
= =∑  be total 
expenditure,  i i s S S =  be the share,  i P  be the population of i and  
2
1 i i P P
= =∑  be total 
population, and  i i p P P =  be the corresponding share. Then the ratio of the expenditure 
share to the population share 
i i i i
i i
s S S S P
p P P S P
= =  is “deflated” per capita expenditure of 
the 
th i  council. If all local councils receive their pro rata expenditure share based on 
population, then   1 i i s p =  for each  . i  Column 7 of Table 2 shows that deflated per capita 
expenditure of Stirling and Three Springs is 0.66 and 2, respectively, so that Stirling 
receives much less its pro rata share and Three Springs much more. Accordingly, if per 
capita  expenditure  is  considered,  the  smallest  local  government  area,  Three  Springs, 
would,  in  effect,  play  a  more  important  role  in  measuring  the  degree  of  fiscal 
decentralisation in WA. Such an approach clearly provides a misleading picture of the 
degree of fiscal decentralisation.  
 
5.4  A note on notation 
In the above discussion, the results are formulated in logarithmic terms. For future 
reference, it is convenient to take the antilogarithm of the inequality measure.    22 
We  start  by  expressing  revenue  inequality  in  terms  of  information  theory  as 
discussed in Section 3. Recall the second component on the right-hand side of equation 
(5.2), the between-set inequality, which is a weighted average of the logarithms of the 









N N = ∑  Let  i m  and  i q  be the revenue share and institutional share of the 
th i  
region, that is,  , i i m M M =  where  , i M M  are the revenue of the 
th i  region and the total 
economy, and  , i i q Q Q =  where  , i Q Q are the number of SNGs in the 
th i  region and the 
total number of SNGs in the economy. As a result,  .
i i i i
i i
m M M M Q
q Q Q M Q
= =  The numerator 
of this ratio is revenue per SNG of the 
th i  region, while the denominator is revenue per 
SNG.  If  [ ] 1,..., N m m ¢ = m   and  [ ] 1,..., , N q q ¢ = q   the  between-region  inequality  can  be 











=∑ m q   
The ratio  i i m q  is “deflated” per SNG revenue of the 
th i  set. The term “deflated” here 
means  that  revenue  is  expressed  as  relative  to  national  revenue  for  SNG.  The  above 
( ) : I m q  is the logarithm of a weighted average of deflated revenue per SNG, so that the 
corresponding geometric mean is: 














m q  
If all SNGs receive their pro rata share based on a number of SNGs, then   1 i i m q =  for 
each  i,  ( ) 1 1
i m N
i i i m q = Õ =  and there is no revenue dispersion. Accordingly, the further is 
the mean (5.7) away from unity, the greater is revenue inequality across sets. Similarly, 
on the expenditure side, the geometric mean is: 
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where  [ ] 1,..., N s s ¢ = s   and  [ ] 1,..., N q q ¢ = q   with  i s   and  i q   is  the  expenditure  share  and 
institutional share of the 
th i  region. 
 
6.  Australia’s fiscal federalism 
This section applies fiscal inequality measures to Australia. These inequalities are 
particularly  relevant  to  the  case  of  Australia  because  there  is  a  great  regional  fiscal 
disparities. We start with a brief description of fiscal arrangements in Australia.  
The Commonwealth of Australia was established in 1901 as a Federation in which 
six self-governing British colonies became the six states of Australia. The main purpose 
of  this  unification  was  to  form  a  strong  and  open  country  by  eliminating  tariff  on 
interstate trade. More than one century after its formation, modern Australia is still seen 
as  a  “young”  country  in  comparison  with  many  nations  from  the  “old”  world.  The 
Commonwealth  of  Australia  now  consists  of  six  states  and  two  territories  (hereafter 
referred to in aggregate as the “States”) with a total number of local councils of 700. The 
eight “states” of Australia are New South Wales (NSW), Victoria (VIC), Queensland 
(QLD),  South  Australia  (SA),  Western  Australia  (WA),  Tasmania  (TAS)  and  two 
territories, Northern Territory (NT) and Australian Capital Territory (ACT). The first tier 
of  government  is  occupied  by  the  Commonwealth  government.  The  second  tier  is 
represented by state governments. The third and lowest tier of governments is represented 
by local councils. In geographic terms, the three levels of governments are not mutually 
exclusive. The geographic region associated with each state includes both a state and 
many  local  governments.  The  geographic  area  associated  with  the  Commonwealth 
government also includes state and local governments. As such, the fiscal authority of 
different  levels  of  government  overlaps  –  residents  in  each  local  government  are 
influenced by fiscal activities of local, state, and Commonwealth governments.  
However,  ACT  has  no  local  governments  because  of  its  special  nature  of 
administration. As such, the ACT government  performs two roles: one as the “state” 
government and another role as the “local” government. On this basis, the total number of 
local governments in Australia of 700 is allocated to seven “states”, namely NSW (192 
local governments), VIC (79), QLD (125), SA (68), WA (143), TAS (29), and NT (64).   24 
6.1  Revenue and expenditure patterns 
Table 3 reveals that the allocation of revenue and expenditure across local councils 
in Australia is significantly dispersed. Brisbane City Council in Queensland is the largest 
local council in Australia with revenue and expenditure shares of 7.7% and 6.9% of all 
local councils, respectively. The second and third biggest councils are the Gold Coast 
Council (QLD) and Melbourne City (VIC). On the other hand, Timber Creek (NT) is the 
smallest council with revenue and expenditure shares of around 0.0003% and 0.0019%, 
respectively.  As  can  be  seen  from  Figures  2  –  4,  there  is  considerable  dispersion  of 
revenue and expenditure within and between states.  
TABLE 3 
REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE SHARES, 
LOCAL COUNCILS, AUSTRALIA, 2000 - 2004  
Revenue shares (Percent of total)    Expenditure shares (Percent of total) 
No.  Region 
 Number 
of local 
councils  Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation  Min   Max    Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation  Min  Max 
1  NSW  192  0.1744  0.0847  0.2082  0.0013  1.2487    0.1704  0.0913  0.1848  0.0015  0.8386 
2  VIC  79  0.2559  0.1758  0.2410  0.0237  1.6629    0.2784  0.1946  0.2172  0.0273  1.3578 
3  QLD  125  0.2191  0.0603  0.7495  0.0098  7.7079    0.2039  0.0609  0.6666  0.0144  6.9045 
4  SA  68  0.0865  0.0459  0.1155  0.0056  0.7069    0.0899  0.0539  0.1034  0.0079  0.5400 
5  WA  143  0.0617  0.0189  0.1016  0.0041  0.6308    0.0637  0.0257  0.0872  0.0069  0.5387 
6  TAS  29  0.1004  0.0569  0.1156  0.0163  0.4592    0.1006  0.0602  0.1082  0.0210  0.4587 
7  NT  64  0.0203  0.0096  0.0357  0.0003  0.2651    0.0259  0.0139  0.0364  0.0019  0.2665 
Source: Unpublished data from ABS. Data are averages over the period 2000 – 2004. 
FIGURE 2 
DISTRIBUTION OF LOCAL COUNCIL SHARES  
AUSTRALIA, 2000 – 2004  




























































































































































Mean = 0.0014 
SD = 0.0036 
n = 700 
Mean = 0.0014 
SD = 0.0032 
n = 700   25 
 
FIGURE 3 
DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE ACROSS LOCAL COUNCILS 
AUSTRALIAN STATES, 2000 – 2004 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Mean = 0.1664 
SD = 0.1862 
n = 192 
Mean = 0.2845 
SD = 0.2165 
n = 79 
Mean = 0.2047 
SD = 0.6548 
n = 125 
Mean = 0.0915 
SD = 0.1056 
n = 68 
Mean = 0.0641 
SD = 0.089 
n = 143 
Mean = 0.1000 
    SD = 0.1075 
n = 29 
Mean = 0.0227 
SD = 0.0371 
n = 64   26 
FIGURE 4 
DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURE ACROSS LOCAL COUNCILS 
AUSTRALIAN STATES, 2000 – 2004 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Mean = 0.1746 
SD = 0.2161 
n = 192 
Mean = 0.2551 
SD = 0.2486 
n = 79 
Mean = 0.2193 
SD = 0.7328 
n = 125 
Mean = 0.0882 
SD = 0.1168 
n = 68 
Mean = 0.0608 
SD = 0.1027 
n = 143 
Mean = 0.1001 
SD = 0.1161 
n = 29 
Mean = 0.0207 
SD = 0.0377 
n = 64   27 
6.2  Regional and hierarchical fiscal inequality 
Table 4 provides a framework for the analysis of fiscal inequality when SNGs are 
identified geographically. Here, each subnational region consists of the state government 
and  a  number  of  local  governments.  Each  row  of  the  table  represents  one  of  the  G  
regions in the country. Consider region  g  as an example. As indicated in column 2, there 
are  g n  local councils in this region plus one state government, so there are  1 g n +  revenue 
shares,  1 , 1 ,..., , .




g k g k r R
+
= = ∑  as presented in column 




g gk g g k R r
= = Î = = ∑ ∑ ∑ S  as indicated by the last element of column 3. Column 4 of 
the table presents the number of all SNGs in each region,  1,..., , G N N  as well as the total 
number in the whole economy,  . N  
TABLE 4 
THE ANALYTICS OF THE GEOGRAPHIC ALLOCATION OF REVENUE 
Region  Revenue shares  
of subnational region 
Number of subnational regions 
(state and local councils) 
g   Individual shares  Total   
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
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1 , 1 ,..., ,








= ∑  






















To apply the above framework to the Australian case, we have  7, G =  as there are 
six states and one territory that contain local councils (the ACT is excluded as it has no 
local councils). Each of the seven SNGs contains one state government and a number of   28 
local councils. Take Western Australia as an example. As there are 143 councils in this 
state, there are 143 revenue shares  ,1 ,143 ,..., , g g r r  for  , g WA =  while the revenue share for 
the WA state government is  ,144. g r  The total of these 144 shares, 
144
, 1 , g k g k r R
= = ∑  is the 
share of national revenue accounted for by WA. For Australia as a whole, there are 700 
local councils and 7 states, so  707 N = .  
In accordance with the analysis in Section 5, total revenue inequality for Australia 
with  707 N =  and  7 G =  is: 
     
7 7
1 1
log707 ( ) log log .
1 707
g
i g g i
g g
g i g g g g
r R R r
H R R
R N N = Î =
 
- = +  




The  first  component  on  the  right-hand  side  is  the  within-state  inequality  for  revenue 








g i g g
r R r
R
R N = Î
 
 














N = ∑  
 
  Table 5 reveals that within-state fiscal inequality accounts for 96.3% and 96.9% 
total inequality in terms of revenue and expenditure, respectively. As a result, it is clear 
that the within-state fiscal inequality plays a more important role in total inequality of the 
distribution of revenue and expenditure across subnational regions in Australia. This is 
partly because each subnational region includes both state and local governments, and the 
state  government  is  significantly  larger  than  any  local  government  within  the  same 
region. For example, for NSW, the total share  31.7% g R =  in 2004, the state government 
accounts  for 
1 , 27.1%,
g g n r
+ =   leaving  only  4.6%  to  be  divided  among  the  192  local 
governments in NSW. Another reason for the dominance of the within-state component 
of fiscal inequality is the operation of the system of fiscal equalisation in Australia. Fiscal 
equalisation has a tendency to equal per capita revenue and expenditure among states, 
which causes the between-state to be low, or the within-state inequality to be high.   29 
TABLE 5 
GEOGRAPHIC ALLOCATION OF 
FISCAL INEQUALITIES ACROSS SUBNATIONAL REGIONS 
AUSTRALIA, 2004 
Inequality measure  Revenue  Expenditure 
Total inequality  1.727  1.763 
  Between-set inequality   0.063  0.054 
  Within-set inequality (WSI)  1.664  1.709 
Inequality within:     
  New South Wales  0.573  0.622 
  Victoria  0.348  0.343 
  Queensland  0.365  0.340 
  South Australia  0.106  0.123 
  Western Australia  0.228  0.215 
  Tasmania  0.029  0.034 
  Northern Territories  0.015  0.032 
WSI as the percentage of total inequality  96.3  96.9 
   
    Total inequality can also be disaggregated in a hierarchical manner in which the 
two sets to be considered are: (i) the upper-level SNGs, the set consisting of the seven 
states and territories; and (ii) the lower-level SNGs, the 700 local councils. Table 6 below 
presents the results when fiscal inequality is decomposed in this way. The results show 
that when local councils and states are completely isolated in this way, the between-set 
inequality is much larger than the within-set inequality. The between-set inequality 
TABLE 6 
HIERARCHICAL ALLOCATION OF 
FISCAL INEQUALITIES ACROSS LEVELS OF GOVERNMENTS 
AUSTRALIA, 2004 
Inequality measure  Revenue  Expenditure 
Total inequality  1.727  1.763 
  Between-set inequality (BSE)  1.552  1.613 
  Within-set inequality  0.175  0.150 
Inequality within:     
  States governments  0.118  0.108 
  Governments of local councils  0.057  0.042 
BSE as the percentage of total inequality  89.9  91.5   30 
between the states and local councils accounts for about 89.9% of revenue inequality and 
91.5%  of  expenditure  inequality.  This  result  also  reflects  the  ideas  discussed  in  the 
previous paragraph. 
 
6.3  The applications to the second and third approximations 
We now use the Australian data to illustrate the second and third approximations to 
the FDIs. We indicate how the previous development of the fiscal inequality can be used 
to extend the fiscal decentralisation indexes. These ideas are still preliminary and some 
detail still remains to be worked out.  
FIGURE 5 
REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE INEQUALITIES, 















Figure 5 presents the results for the between-state fiscal inequalities for revenue and 
expenditure,  using  the  geometric  mean  of  revenue  [equation  (5.7)]  and  expenditure 
[equation (5.8)], for the  7 N =  states. As previously discussed, if a region receives its pro 
rata revenue (or expenditure) share, then there is no revenue (or expenditure) dispersion 
across  regions.  Figure  5  reveals  that,  NSW,  VIC  and  QLD  receive  on  average  more 
revenue than it would be justified based on pro rata share. On the other hand, SA, WA, 
TAS, and NT receive less revenue. These results confirm the view that there exists a 
dispersion of revenue and expenditure across states in Australia. As a consequence, the   31 
first approximation index, equation (2.3), may not be a comprehensive measure of fiscal 
decentralisation in Australia.  
The first approximation index (2.3) only shows the aggregate of total revenue and 
expenditure of subnational regions. When the dispersion of fiscal shares (for both revenue 
and  expenditure)  across  states  is  insignificant,  the  first  approximation  index  will  be 
adequate. However, when there is a significant dispersion of revenue and expenditure 
across states, the first approximation may not be an accurate measure of the true degree 
of fiscal decentralisation because the impact of dispersion is not accounted for. In this 
case, a second approximation index is needed. The second approximation index modifies 
the first approximation index by incorporating the means (5.7) and (5.8). 
The differences in terms of revenue and expenditure across subnational regions are 
considered by employing the between-set inequality of the distribution of revenue and 
expenditure across subnational regions. However, fiscal differences among local councils 
within the states have still been ignored. From Figures 3 and 4, it is clear that for all states 
there is a significant dispersion of revenue shares and expenditure shares across local 
councils within the same state. Consider again the local councils in WA. In terms of 
revenue and expenditure, the City of Stirling is the biggest local council in WA with its 
shares  of  7.46%  and  5.97%  total  region’s  revenue  and  expenditure,  respectively.  By 
contrast, the revenue share and expenditure share for the smallest local council in this 
state is 0.04% (the Shire of Nungarin) and 0.08% (the Shire of Three Springs). As the 
consequence,  the  differences  among  councils  within  the  same  state  should  also  be 
considered. As such, total fiscal inequality among subnational regions, as discussed in 
Section 5, is incorporated in the third approximation of the FDI.  
 
7.  Concluding remarks 
 
Economic  aspect  of  fiscal  decentralisation  has  recently  attracted  a  noticeable 
increase  in  attention  from  academics  and  international  institutions  such  as  the  World 
Bank. The question has been raised how fiscal decentralisation across countries can be 
measured.  The  main  contribution  of  this  paper  is  that  it  develops  the  fiscal 
decentralisation index (“FDI”), known as the first approximation index, which takes into   32 
account both fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance of subnational governments – two 
corner-stones  in  the  literature  of  fiscal  federalism.  Fiscal  autonomy  of  subnational 
governments is defined by the ratio of own sourced revenue and expenditure made by 
subnational governments. To facilitate comparisons across countries, this ratio is subject 
to an adjustment factor that considers differences in fiscal arrangements such as the share 
of  unconditional  grants  in  total  grants  received,  the  extent  to  which  subnational 
governments can access financial markets, and so on. While the first approximation is 
fundamental in nature, it ignores the role of dispersion of revenue and expenditure across 
subnational regions.  
One of the main ideas of the paper can be illustrated with a simple example. 
Consider two hypothetical nations M and N which consist of four subnational regions: A, 
B, C and D, each with different level of revenue. It is assumed that government spending 
and  revenue  at  the  national  level  accounts  for  50  percent  of  the  total,  so  that  the 
remaining 50 percent is the responsibility of subnational government. For simplicity, it is 
further assumed that expenditure of each SNG is equal to its revenue. Table 7 provides 
data for this example.  
   TABLE 7 
   ILLUSTRATING FISCAL INEQUALITY  
                                  
      Country M     Country N 




($)  Actual  Average   Difference     ($)  Actual  Average   Difference  
  (1)    (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) = (4) – (3)    (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) = (8) – (7) 
                                   
1   A     3,000  0.010  0.250  0.240    3,300  0.011  0.250  0.239 
2   B     125,000  0.427  0.250  -0.177    271,390  0.926  0.250  -0.676 
3   C     97,000  0.331  0.250  -0.081    10,810  0.037  0.250  0.213 
4   D     68,000  0.232  0.250  0.018    7,500  0.026  0.250  0.224 
5  Total    293,000  1.000  1.000  0.000    293,000  1.000  1.000  0.000 
6  FDI      0.500  0.500        0.500  0.500   
7  Standard deviation      0.178  0.000        0.451  0.000   
8  Entropy      0.484  0.602        0.146  0.602   
9  Fiscal Inequality      0.118  0.000        0.456  0.000   
                                 
Revenue raised by all SNGs is equal in two countries, as presented in row 5 of columns 2 
and  6.  Total  government  expenditure,  the  sum  of  spending  made  by  the  national 
government and all SNGs, is  293,000 2 586,000. ´ =  Column 2 shows that there is one   33 
small region in country M, region A. Revenue from region B is almost double that of D 
and forty times higher than that of region A. Columns 3 and 4 present the actual and 
average revenue shares for 4 regions in country M. By contrast, in country N, there is one 
large and three small regions. Region B accounts for more than 92% of the total revenue 
of all regions, and the remaining 8% is spread across the three small regions A, C, and D.  
Table 7 contains the following important points on the relationship between the first 
approximation index, entropy and fiscal inequality: 
￿  The Adjustment Factor (“AF”) is assumed to be 0.5 for both countries M and N. 
Using the index developed in Section 2.3, the first approximation to the FDI for 






= ´ =   
  
 The same value of 
FDI  applies  to  these  countries  irrespective  of  the  distribution  of  revenue,  as 
indicated by row 6 and columns 3, 4, 7, and 8. This reflects the fact that the first 
approximation only considers the aggregate level of revenue and expenditure of 
SNGs. 
￿  Row 7 presents the standard deviations of the revenue shares of the two, 0.178 
and 0.451. This clearly reveals that the distribution of revenue of country N is 
more dispersed than in M. 
￿  Row 8 gives the values of the fiscal entropy, defined as  log , i i r r -∑  where  i r  is 
the revenue share of SNG  . i  The entropy value in country M is 0.484 and 0.146 
in country N, as shown in columns 3 and 7 of row 8, respectively. If we were to 
assume alternatively that each region accounts for the same share of 25%, as 
shown by columns 4 and 8, there is no inequality, so that fiscal entropy for both 
countries is log4 0.602, =  as in row 8, columns 4 and 8. 
￿  Row 9 presents the fiscal inequality, the difference between the maximum level 
of the entropy,  log4, or 0.602, and the actual level. Fiscal inequality is 0.118 
and 0.456 for countries M and N, respectively. Higher fiscal inequality in N 
means a greater degree of revenue dispersion, and as a result, a lower degree of 
fiscal  decentralisation  because  revenue  is  allocated  more  disproportionately 
across regions.   34 
To  summarise  this  example,  according  to  the  first  approximation  index,  both 
countries exhibit the same degree of fiscal decentralisation. But as there is much more 
fiscal inequality in country N, it can be reasonably concluded that the true situation is 
markedly different: there is less fiscal decentralised in country N. This shows that the first 
approximation  provides  a  misleading  picture  of  the  degree  of  fiscal  decentralisation 
because it ignores the dispersion of revenue (and expenditure) across regions. As a result, 
further development of the first approximation index to reflect dispersion is desirable.  
Another key idea of the paper is the analysis on the composition of fiscal inequality. 
Fiscal inequality can be decomposed into between-set and within-set components. The set 
can be defined in one of two alternative ways:  
￿  Geographically whereby the country is split into a number of regions, and then 
fiscal  inequality  across  SNGs  contained  in  each  region  is  examined.  For 
example, in Australia there are eight states and territories, each containing one 
state government and a number of local governments (the only exception is the 
ACT that contains no local government). 
￿  Hierarchically  whereby  the  country  is  divided  into  two  groups:  (i)  all  state 
governments;  and  (ii)  all  local  governments.  For  Australia,  seven  state  and 
territory governments (excluding the ACT) are in one group and the 700 local 
governments are in the other. 
 
FIGURE 6 
FISCAL INEQUALITY BY COMPONENT 
AUSTRALIA, 2004 
Geographical  Hierarchical 










10.1%   35 
Figure  6  presents  a  summary  of  the  results  of  fiscal  inequality  in  Australia  by 
component. The results reveal that within-set inequality plays a significant role when the 
set is defined on a geographic basis. The insignificance of the between-set inequality for 
regions  can  be  partly  explained  by  the  application  of  fiscal  equalisation  in  Australia 
whereby the Federal government allocates GST revenue among the states in a manner 
that gives the states equal capacity to provide a standard level of service provided their 
revenue raising (i.e. tax and royalty) is the same. Another reason for the dominance of the 
regional within-set component is that each region contains state and local governments; 
and in most cases, the state government is substantially larger than local governments. By 
contrast, when groups are defined hierarchically, the between-set inequality accounts for 
about 90% of the total  inequality. This result reflects the  fact that state governments 
account  for  a  significant  share  in  total  revenue  or  expenditure  of  subnational 
governments.   36 
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